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AbstrAct
It is generally acknowledged that the 1910 Prin-
cipia does not deny the existence of classes, but 
claims only that the theory it advances can be 
developed so that any apparent commitment to 
them is eliminable by the method of contextual 
analysis. The application of contextual analysis 
to ontological questions is widely viewed as the 
central philosophical innovation of russell’s 
theory of descriptions. Principia’s “no-classes 
theory of classes” is a striking example of such 
an application. The present paper develops a re-
construction of Principia’s theory of functions 
and classes that is based on russell’s epistemo-
logical applications of the method of contextual 
analysis. such a reconstruction is not eliminativ-
ist—indeed, it explicitly assumes the existence of 
classes—and possesses certain advantages over 
the no–classes theory advocated by Whitehead 
and russell.
Key words: russell, Principia Mathematica, 
no-class theory, contextual definition, theory 
of descriptions, ramified type theory, axiom of 
reducibility, impredicative definition, proposi-
tional function
1. Introduction
The 19101 Principia’s theory of proposi-
tional functions and classes is officially 
a “no-classes theory of classes,” a theory 
according to which classes are eliminable. 
but it is clear from Principia’s solution 
to the class paradoxes that although the 
theory it advances holds that classes are 
eliminable, it does not deny their exis-
tence. Whitehead and russell argue from 
the supposition that classes involve or 
presuppose propositional functions to the 
conclusion that the paradoxical classes 
are excluded by the nature of such func-
tions. This supposition rests on the repre-
sentation of classes by class abstracts and 
* The present paper is part of a longer study, ‘The 1910 
Principia’s theory of functions and classes,’ which will 
be published at a later date.
** I am grateful to the social sciences and Humani-
ties research council of canada for support of my 
research. Many thanks to Peter Koellner, Michael 
Friedman, solomon Feferman and Peter clark for 
stimulating discussions on the topics dealt with here.
1  This qualification is always to be understood; I 
do not address the theory of the 1925 edition. With 
one exception, all my citations are to volume I of the 
work.
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the technique of contextual analysis. but at no stage does Principia’s solution to the 
paradoxes appeal to anything so strong as the denial of classes. Indeed, its account of 
the paradoxes is a striking vindication of the traditional “logical” conception of class, 
since it shows the resolution of the difficulties to depend on the close association be-
tween properties (or propositional functions) and classes that is the hallmark of that 
conception. 
It is therefore clear that the status of classes in Principia is a matter of some subtlety: 
any apparent commitment to them is eliminable by the method of contextual analysis, 
but the “reduction” of classes to propositional functions which such an analysis effects 
does not, by itself, militate against assuming their existence any more than the reduc-
tion of propositions about scott to propositions that do not contain him as a constitu-
ent militate against assuming his existence. Nor would the elimination of classes solve 
the paradoxes. The key step in the solution of the class paradoxes is their “dependence” 
on propositional functions. Hence whether or not classes are regarded as superfluous, 
it remains to show that there is a paradox-free notion of propositional function. For 
this and other reasons (to be discussed below) the approach to Principia I advocate is 
one that sets entirely to one side the program of avoiding a commitment to classes or 
viewing them as superfluous; instead it reconstructs the work within a framework that 
admits classes. 
With the exception of Principia’s eliminativist sympathies, the reconstruction I propose 
leaves intact almost all of the work’s distinctive features while showing it to contain a 
theory of our knowledge of classes of considerable elegance. Here and elsewhere, when 
I speak of our knowledge of classes, this should be understood in terms of russell’s 
well-known distinction between knowledge of truths and knowledge of things.2 My pur-
pose is to expound what I take to be Principia’s implicit theory of our knowledge of 
classes as a species of knowledge of things. The theory that emerges bears some similar-
ity to russell’s theory of knowledge of things known by acquaintance and by descrip-
tion, but it is not a straightforward transcription of that theory to the case of classes. 
The important similarity to bear in mind is that the theory is first and foremost a theory 
of how classes can be the subjects of propositions that are asserted of them, rather than 
a theory of our knowledge of the truth of such propositions. I hope to show that such a 
theory is of interest even if it fails to address everything one might reasonably wish to 
know concerning our knowledge of classes.
There are at least two desiderata that it would evidently be desirable for a reconstruc-
tion of Principia’s theory of functions and classes to satisfy:
(1) A reconstruction should motivate ramifying the simple type-theoretical hierarchy 
of propositional functions. to do so it must show that propositional functions are plau-
sibly represented as satisfying the requirements expressed by ramification. This would 
2  see for example russell 1912 pp. 44-45 and ch. 5.
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follow if it could be shown that the relevant vicious circle principles which constitute 
russell’s diagnosis of the paradoxes are analytic of the concept of a propositional func-
tion; to establish this conclusion is a primary aim of the present paper. 
(2) A successful reconstruction should also explain why the axiom of reducibility is 
intrinsically plausible within the framework of a ramified theory of functions and class-
es. This goal has proved elusive. It is an unfortunate consequence of the influence of 
ramsey (1925) that the usual view of the ramified theory of types is that while it may 
be essential to russell’s solution of the semantic paradoxes, it is at best unmotivated in 
the case of the theory of classes. And since (as shown by Myhill (1974)) the theory is 
too weak to recover arithmetic without an axiom of reducibility, extending the theory 
by the inclusion of such an axiom has come to be regarded as irremediably ad hoc. The 
present reconstruction seeks to make the ramified theory with reducibility plausible as 
a theory of our knowledge of functions and classes, whatever its usefulness and plausi-
bility as an account of the semantic paradoxes.3 
2. Overview
The following overview may provide a useful orientation to the reconstruction I am 
proposing, even though it assumes familiarity with notions to be explained in the se-
quel. On my view, the interest of russell’s logicism is almost wholly epistemological: 
the central point of the ramified theory of functions and classes is to show how, from 
the assumption that there are certain classes, it is possible to provide an account of 
our knowledge of them. The class N of natural numbers is the paradigm example of a 
class, knowledge of which, Principia seeks to explain. Its approach to our knowledge 
of N appeals to the method of logical construction, an approach that follows the clas-
sical Frege-Dedekind definition of N in terms of the satisfaction of all inductive func-
tions of zero. However Frege’s and Dedekind’s methodology elides distinctions of order. 
When the definition is reformulated within the framework of ramified types, its success 
depends on the presence of a sufficiently rich supply of predicative functions. by the 
axiom of reducibility there is a plethora of such functions, and as has long been recog-
nized, reducibility is unexceptionable if one assumes the existence of classes. When the 
Occamism of Principia is set to one side and classes are admitted, the ramified theory of 
3  I have throughout been guided by gödel’s fundamental paper (1944), and by Warren goldfarb’s (1989) response 
to it. I have also benefited from Leonard Linsky’s (1987), which I have found in many ways insightful. Here I have 
in mind especially his remark that “[Principia presents] an iterative concept of functions, which is formally similar 
to cantor’s original iterative concept of sets” (p. 37). but I also have a number of difficulties with Linsky’s paper: 
The discussion of propositional functions (on pp. 35-37) relies too heavily on the 1910 Introduction’s notion of 
an “ambiguity” to yield a proper reconstruction of the relevant remarks; russell’s emphasis on the extensionality 
of classes in his letter to Frege (of 24 July 1902 which Linsky quotes on p. 28) hardly shows him to have explicitly 
formulated “the mathematical or iterative concept of sets” as Linsky implies; and contrary to Linsky’s claim on p. 
26, although Frege may have doubted the suitability of Law V as an axiom, until russell’s famous letter he never 
questioned its consistency. 
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functions and classes is readily seen to contain a compelling account of our knowledge 
of classes such as N.
The role of reducibility is not dissimilar from that of Principia’s axiom of infinity. Arith-
metic poses two basically epistemological questions for logicism: 
(i) What does our knowledge of the Dedekind infinity of the numbers rest upon?
(ii) How is reasoning by induction justified? 
Principia’s answers to both questions depend on the provision of logical constructions. 
but the constructions succeed only if they are provided with a sufficiently rich base on 
which to operate. In connection with (i), there must be a “simple infinity” of objects i of 
lowest type for the construction of the numbers to return their Dedekind infinity when 
they are represented as objects of (simple) type ((i)), i.e. as classes of classes of individu-
als. In the case of (ii) there must be enough predicative functions of the reconstructed 
numbers in order that the class defined by the ramified form of the Frege-Dedekind 
definition is one for which mathematical induction is recoverable in its full generality. 
Neither existence assumption is one that logic is capable of securing, but if the assump-
tions they express are correct, the logical constructions succeed in addressing both 
questions (i) and (ii). Hence far from signifying the failure of the program of a logical 
foundation for arithmetic, the necessity of such existence assumptions simply confirms 
the idea that although logic is capable of addressing what is consequent upon various 
existence assumptions, it cannot settle the existence questions themselves. Principia’s 
success in connection with the epistemology of arithmetic is therefore a kind of tri-
umph for logicism, although in so far as it is forced to give up any claim to having es-
tablished the apriority of these two existence claims, it is not the triumph a traditional 
logicist such as Frege desired. 
3. Types and orders 
My discussion assumes very little by way of the technical elaboration of the theory of 
types. briefly, the simple type hierarchy of propositional functions begins with the type 
of individuals and proceeds to functions of individuals, functions of functions of indi-
viduals, etc. ramification imposes a system of orders on the functions of any type. I as-
sume that the simple hierarchy of functions is stratified, but orders may be cumulative 
or stratified. The discussion is intended to be broad enough to accommodate any rea-
sonable formalization of ramification which embodies the following four constraints 
on the assignment of (finite) orders: (i) individuals have order 0; (ii) functions have 
order at least 1; (iii) only propositional functions of an order lower than a function can 
occur as arguments to the function; (iv) a variable bound by a quantifier occurring in a 
function can range only over functions of an order lower than the order of the function 
itself. The base of this hierarchy can be expanded to include propositions; provision 
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must then be made for orders of propositions (by contrast with individuals, among 
which there are no distinctions of order), and the type of propositions must be distin-
guished from the type of individuals. The hierarchy then continues with propositional 
functions whose arguments include propositions (and perhaps individuals), functions 
of such propositions, etc., together with an appropriate system of orders at every level 
of the expanded hierarchy. such an expansion is not considered here since our focus 
is the theory of functions and classes, and this involves only the hierarchy of functions 
based on the type of individuals. Nor do I consider the possibility (which Principia also 
does not pursue) of extending the hierarchy of types into the transfinite.
Intuitively, the order of a propositional function is a rough measure of the complexity 
of its quantificational structure. Functions of least complexity involve no quantifica-
tions over other functions within their type. such functions are the functions of order 
1, and in Principia they are called “predicative functions”; those that are not predica-
tive are called “non-predicative functions.” (It should be noted that this terminology 
is peculiar to Principia. On this use of ‘predicative,’ a predicative function is not one 
whose definition is predicative rather than impredicative, since even a function which 
occurs primitively and without definition can be predicative in the intended sense.) 
The predicative and non-predicative functions form a hierarchy of predicable entities 
based on the type of individuals. The predicative functions form a substructure of this 
hierarchy which I will sometimes refer to as “the predicative hierarchy.” The members 
of the predicative hierarchy are logically transparent. The non-predicative functions are 
logically complex by virtue of having a quantificational structure that includes quanti-
fication over other functions. 
classes and individuals form a separate hierarchy of objects, one that is simple, not 
ramified; this hierarchy begins with individuals and proceeds to classes of individuals, 
classes of classes of individuals, etc. There is no notion of the order of a class, or equiva-
lently, all classes are of the same order. 
Principia replaces the traditional logicist’s concepts with propositional functions, which 
are a kind of abstract intensional entity, not to be identified with the open sentences 
of a language of fixed vocabulary or even the indefinitely extendable one of Principia. 
consequently, the hierarchy they comprise may be as large as any hierarchy of classes 
whose membership they are intended to determine. This is in keeping with the admis-
sion (Principia Vol. 2 p. vii) that there are always more propositional functions than 
there are individuals.4
4  There is a significant secondary literature which seeks to establish a nominalistic interpretation of propositional 
functions as linguistic expressions. There may be an interesting reconstruction of the theory of types along these 
lines, but it cannot be advanced, as it sometimes is, as a correct representation of russell’s intentions in the period 
under study. Not only is there the point made in the text regarding the cardinality of propositional functions rela-
tive to that of individuals, but there are explicit statements to the contrary which simply cannot be passed off as 
mere slips. consider, for example, the following passage from §V of (russell 1908 p. 80): “A propositional function 
of x may, as we have seen, be of any order; hence any statement about ‘all properties of x’ is meaningless. (A ‘prop-
erty of x’ is the same thing as a ‘propositional function which holds of x.’)” 
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The notion of type is readily extended to variables; the type of variables for individu-
als differs from that of functions of individuals, and both in turn differ from that for 
functions of functions of individuals, etc. In Principia, there are special symbols for 
variables for functions of lowest order, but no other orders are explicitly indicated by 
the symbolism. because of the required division of variables into types and orders, 
variables are not universal; they are not unrestricted in their scope. The loss of the “un-
restricted variable” is addressed at the level of the language of Principia by the device of 
typical ambiguity, according to which the type of a syntactic expression for a variable 
is ambiguous: the same symbol may stand for a variable of any type; and within any 
type, the same symbol can stand for a predicative function of that type. It is therefore 
ambiguous what proposition or propositional function is expressed by a formula. since 
what matters are only relative types, the ambiguity as to type can never lead to a viola-
tion of the type restrictions. 
The device of typical ambiguity yields a considerable notational simplification. but its 
philosophical point is that it allows russell to recover a surrogate for the unrestricted 
variable of his pre-type-theoretic view.5 As we have just seen, this arises from a combi-
nation of two ideas: the variables constituent in a proposition or propositional function 
are of maximal scope within a type, and the symbols by which variables are expressed 
are ambiguously interpretable over arbitrary types.
4. The basic logicist model of our knowledge of classes
The classical epistemological problem posed by classes can arise in connection with 
our knowledge of any infinite class. As such it is importantly different from the prob-
lem of determining the composition of the set theoretic universe and from the related 
concern with the independence questions of set theory. The problem is to explain how 
classes are “given” to us, a problem that has an obvious parallel with Frege’s question, 
in §62 of Grundlagen, “How, then, are numbers given to us, if we cannot have ideas or 
intuitions of them?” As with numbers, for classes to be acceptable to a logicist it must 
be possible to provide an account of our knowledge of them that does not rest on ideas 
or intuitions. The traditional logicist answer is that classes are given to us as the exten-
sions of concepts.6 This epistemological question and Principia’s nuanced development 
of a logicist answer to it are our central focus. As we will see in greater detail, Principia’s 
implicit theory of our knowledge of classes is carried out within a framework of exis-
tence assumptions about propositional functions. The principal justification for these 
5  I owe this observation to bernie Linsky.
6  The appeal of this answer was not confined to logicists. It was, for example, strongly endorsed by Weyl in his 
book on the continuum. For a discussion of Weyl, together with relevant references and citations, see Parsons 2002 
§1, esp. pp. 380 – 381. 
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assumptions is that they support the account of how certain classes, which we unques-
tionably know, are known. 
Knowledge of a class is mediated by knowledge of a propositional function which de-
termines it. Knowledge of special classes by means of knowledge of the predicative 
functions that determine them is assumed to be unproblematic, but it constitutes the 
exception not the rule. The theory of propositional functions which evolved out of 
Frege’s logical investigations allows for a rich variety of forms of propositional function. 
The general epistemic situation for which an account is developed is the one in which 
our knowledge of a class is mediated by knowledge of a non-predicative function, i.e., 
by a logical construction based on a small and limited number of known predicative 
functions. An account of such cases is especially desirable when the non-predicative 
function has an independent foundational interest of its own, as is the case with the 
Frege-Dedekind definition of the class of natural numbers. According to this defini-
tion, the class of natural numbers is the class of all u which satisfy every inductive func-
tion of zero, where a function is inductive if whenever it is possessed by u it is possessed 
by u’s immediate successor. Assuming knowledge of zero and immediate succession, the 
definition explains our epistemic access to the class of natural numbers in terms of our 
grasp of a propositional function whose additional complexity is wholly logical; for, un-
der the hypothesis that zero and immediate succession are understood, natural number 
is explained in terms of the notion, every propositional function. The difficulty which 
the Frege-Dedekind definition presents is one of preserving its success in determining 
exactly the class of natural numbers while respecting the theory of types and orders.
5. Semantic and epistemic dependency
taking an uncritically realist view of propositional functions and classes clarifies the 
special epistemic role functions play in the theory by marking a sharp separation of 
two types of dependency of classes on propositional functions. I express these as two 
dependency theses, of which the first is the
Semantic dependency thesis. All truths concerning classes are reducible to the 
use of class abstracts. Insofar as an abstract employs a propositional function 
that holds precisely of the members of the class, the thesis implies that classes 
presuppose their defining functions. 
since a class abstract is a definite description, one of the form, 
the class of all u such that ϕu, 
the semantic dependency thesis is sometimes expressed by the claim that classes are 
“incomplete symbols.” In Principia, the thesis is advanced as plausible but not proven. 
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The core of the present reconstruction is a weaker thesis which is arguably implicit in 
Principia, even if it is not as central to the work as it is to my reconstruction of it. The 
thesis may be formulated as the 
Epistemic dependency thesis. Except for finite classes, our knowledge of a class 
cannot consist in knowledge of its members but must appeal to a propositional 
function which the members of the class all satisfy. 
The epistemic dependency thesis depends upon the semantic dependency thesis for its 
generality, since if the latter thesis failed to hold for some infinite class, the class would 
not be epistemically accessible. Although the converse dependence does not hold, the 
semantic dependency thesis is unmotivated outside the context of a logical theory of 
classes. It seems plausible to suppose that every logical theory of classes is committed to 
the epistemic dependency thesis.
by the no-classes theory of classes I understand the philosophical proposal that we 
should infer from the truth of the semantic dependency thesis that classes are superflu-
ous. The reducibility of truths concerning classes to truths involving the use of class ab-
stracts is the basic premise of the no-classes theory, and in Principia the superflousness 
of classes is derived from the semantic dependency thesis and a principle of ontological 
economy: 
…we shall assume a proposition about a class always to be reduced to a statement 
about a function which defines the class, i.e. about a function which is satisfied 
by the members of the class and no other arguments. Thus a class is an object 
derived from a function and presupposing the function, just as, for example, (u).
ϕu presupposes the function ϕû. (Principia pp. 62-63)
… In the case of descriptions it was possible to prove that they are incomplete 
symbols. In the case of classes, we don’t know of any equally definite proof. It 
is not necessary for our purposes to assert dogmatically that there are no such 
things as classes. It is only necessary for us to show that the incomplete symbols 
which we introduce as representative of classes yield all the propositions for the 
sake of which classes might be thought essential. When this has been shown, the 
mere principle of economy of primitive ideas leads to the non-introduction of 
classes except as incomplete symbols (Principia p. 72).
Indeed, the no-classes theory is so closely linked to its justification in terms of the 
semantic dependency thesis that the two are often identified. The basic contention of 
the present reconstruction is that we should refrain from drawing an ontological les-
son from the semantic dependency thesis and, in accordance with the epistemic de-
pendency thesis, take our knowledge of classes to be facilitated by our knowledge of 
propositional functions.
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There is a third dependency thesis associated with the logical theory of classes that I 
have not mentioned:
(*) A class constitutes one object or forms a unity because its elements all satisfy a 
common propositional function.
This thesis does not play a major role in my analysis. to begin with, the logical theory 
of classes seeks to explain the unity of a class by appeal to the class’s association with a 
propositional function. but if we assume the existence of classes, it is unclear how ex-
planatory (*) is. For then, given a class α together with the relation ε of class member-
ship, (*) is satisfiable by the function û ε α (see PM p. 58). by contrast with the logical 
notion of class, according to the mathematical notion of set, a set is not only exten-
sional, it is constituted by its members. classes also satisfy a principle of extensionality 
(PM *20.15), but they are not constituted by their elements. A set may comprise some 
sort of unity, but on the mathematical conception, this is not explained by its associa-
tion with a propositional function, but has the status of a primitive fact about sets and 
the process of collecting. The difficulty raised by appeal to a function like û ε α is that it 
doesn’t take us any further than the mathematical concept of set toward explaining the 
unity of α. At most (*) shows that the logical conception of class can be justified relative 
to the mathematical notion of set, an observation which I take to be the correct lesson 
of Principia’s discussion (on p. 58) of the assumption that there are classes.
suppose, however, that the italicized expressions of (*) are replaced with constitutes one 
object of thought and forms a unity capable of entering into a judgment, respectively; this 
yields:
(**) A class constitutes one object of thought or forms a unity capable of entering into 
a judgment because its elements all satisfy a common propositional function.
(**) follows from the epistemic dependency thesis. It also may appear to be trivially 
satisfiable since, for any given class, we can always express such a function with a name 
for the class and the symbol for the membership relation. However there is a reason-
able basis for rejecting the suggestion that the thesis is so easily satisfied in its epistemic 
form. to satisfy (**) the class must be “given” to us in order to be provided with a name 
from which an expression for a function for it can be constructed. but if the class is suf-
ficiently complex, it may not be possible that it should be given to us as the argument 
assumes: (**) may be satisfiable—there may be a function by which the class can be 
known—but that there is, is not established by so simple an extension of the argument 
that sufficed for (*).
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6. The concept of a propositional function
In light of the foregoing, what principles should constrain the concept of a proposi-
tional function and the notion of class that it supports? There is an aspect of the itera-
tive concept of set that bears on our question. Although it may seem strange to apply 
an idea from the mathematical concept of set to the reconstruction of a logical theory 
of classes, it will soon become apparent that such an application is not only legitimate, 
but is actually mandated by the coherent development of the concept of a propositional 
function and the theory to which it belongs. The aspect of the iterative concept of set 
that we require is the independence it ascribes to the elements of a set: According to the 
iterative concept, a set’s elements exist independently of their membership in the set. A 
parallel supposition constrains the concept of a propositional function: 
Argument Independence. The objects on which a propositional function acts exist 
independently of their connection with the function.
There is some textual basis for Argument Independence, at least for the case of functions 
of individuals. Thus, in the 1910 Introduction an argument is said to be a “constituent” 
of the proposition which is the value of the function for it as argument. The explanation 
of constituency which immediately follows has the clear implication that constituents 
exist independently of the function and are properly objects of quantification, or what 
russell calls “complete symbols”: 
[O]bjects which are neither propositions nor functions … we shall call individuals. 
such objects will be constituents of propositions or functions, and will be genuine 
constituents, in the sense that they do not disappear under analysis, as for example 
classes do, or phrases of the form “the so and so”. (Principia p. 51) 
For sets, two ideas are critical. The first idea, typically associated with the iterative con-
ception, is the elements’ independence of any set to which they belong. The second idea 
is the dependence of a set on its elements—the extensionality of sets; this is essential 
to any concept of set, but, as we have noted, on the iterative conception extensional-
ity is forced by the requirement that a set is constituted by its elements. by contrast, 
propositional functions are not constituted by the things of which they are true; they 
are therefore not required to satisfy an extensional criterion of identity.7 Propositional 
functions, unlike sets, fulfill a representational role. This comes about as follows. 
7  A point of difference between propositional functions and Fregean concepts is that the latter satisfy a principle 
of extensionality, a condition Frege took to be weaker than the claim that concepts are constituted by the objects 
which fall under them. For Frege even classes are not constituted by their elements, as is clear from his remark to 
Peano that “… one must not view a class as constituted by its objects for then in removing the objects one would 
remove the class” (1980 p.109). 
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A central problem which Principles sought to address is to explain how it is possible 
to have knowledge of objects of infinite complexity when our intelligence is capable of 
grasping only objects of finite complexity. Its answer depends on the theory of denoting 
concepts:
With regard to infinite classes, say the class of numbers, it is to be observed that 
the concept all numbers, though not itself infinitely complex, yet denotes an 
infinitely complex object. This is the inmost secret of our power to deal with 
infinity. An infinitely complex concept, though there may be such, certainly 
cannot be manipulated by the human intelligence, but infinite collections, owing 
to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated without introducing any concepts 
of infinite complexity. (Principles §72)
The solution to this problem in Principia differs from that of Principles because of Prin-
cipia’s almost total rejection of the theory of denoting on which Principles is based. 
In Principia, the relevant entities of finite complexity are propositional functions. by 
grasping them we are able to have knowledge of infinitely complex objects. but the fea-
ture of propositional functions on which their ability to accomplish this task depends is 
the presence in them of variables; it is this feature that distinguishes functions from sets 
and classes and it is the presence of variables in functions that facilitates their finitary 
representation of objects of infinite complexity.8 
Variables are acceptable in a way in which the denoting concepts of the older theories 
of denoting are not. Denoting concepts—such as all men, some numbers, and the even 
prime—differ from one another both formally and materially. However, variables are 
distinguished from one another only formally. The association of a variable with its 
range shares with the older notion of denoting the idea that a variable is symbolic, or, 
as I say, representational. but other aspects of denoting that are appropriate to denot-
ing concepts are foreign to the relation a variable bears to its range. For example, in 
the older theory, different denoting concepts are associated with different pluralities of 
individuals, and within a plurality, with different combinations of its members. Thus 
all numbers denotes a different non-relational combination of the plurality of numbers 
than does some numbers, while the even prime denotes an individual rather than any 
kind of combination of members of a plurality. Nothing like this is true of variables; 
their distinctive feature is that they are capable of standing indifferently for anything 
falling within their range. Principia continues to use the language of the theory of de-
noting, saying of ϕû that it ambiguously denotes ϕa, ϕb, ϕc, etc. by virtue of the pres-
ence of the variable u. The relation of ambiguously denoting or ranging over that holds 
8  In this connection compare russell’s remark to Moore that “[in ‘On denoting’] I only profess to reduce the prob-
lem of denoting to the problem of the variable”. (Letter to Moore of 25 October 1905, (russell 1994 p. xxxv), quoted 
by Urquhart in his “Editor’s introduction” to the volume.) I concur with this conclusion. It will be seen, however, 
that I do not treat variables as denoting concepts; russell’s cautious formulation suggests that at the time of writing 
he may not have done so either.
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between a variable and its range replaces the earlier relation of denoting which a denot-
ing concept bears to its denotation.
since it cannot be taken for granted that variables are unrestricted, it is necessary to 
make allowance for the possibility that a function’s component variables have limited 
ranges. It follows that the domain of possible arguments to a function may also be 
restricted. Although not constituted by the things of which they are true, the presence 
of variables in propositional functions means that they satisfy a dependence condition 
that is weaker than, but evidently related to, the principle of extensionality. I call this 
condition Function Dependence to distinguish it from the complete dependence of a set 
on its elements, and I formulate it as follows:
Function Dependence. A propositional function presupposes the totality of 
its possible arguments and any totality over which its constituent quantified 
variables range.9 
It should be emphasized that the imposition of Function Dependence is justified merely 
by the requirement that some provision should be made for the possibility that func-
tions are in some way typed; the condition does not, by itself, impose typing. 
Let me briefly summarize the conclusions we have reached: The logical notion of class 
is based on that of a propositional function. And the relevant concept of propositional 
function is one which is based on principles—Argument Independence and Function 
Dependence—which parallel the principles governing the mathematical concept of set: 
Argument Independence is the analog of the thesis that sets are based or founded on their 
elements and Function Dependence is the analog of the thesis that sets are constituted 
by their elements.
7. Vicious circle principles
As for the vicious circle principles that constituted russell’s mature diagnosis of the 
paradoxes and led him to ramification, we wish to know whether they are analytic 
of the notions of propositional function and class as we have proposed these notions 
should be understood.
Following on the discussion of gödel (1944), it is useful to distinguish a general vicious 
circle principle for “totalities,” and two that apply more specifically to functions:
9  A representative formulation of Principia is: “A function … presupposes as part of its meaning the totality of its 
values, or, what comes to the same thing, the totality of its possible arguments…” (p. 54). And “…the values of a 
function are presupposed by the function, not vice versa” (p. 39).
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General VCP. No totality can contain members involving or presupposing the 
totality; hence, no totality of all arguments to a function can contain members 
involving or presupposing the totality of its arguments.
Strong VCP. No function can belong to a totality which it involves or 
presupposes.
Weak VCP. No function can have arguments involving or presupposing the 
function.
All three principles are distinct from the prohibition against impredicative definition 
for which there are three parallel principles: 
General Impredicativity. No totality can contain members definable only in 
terms of the totality; hence, no totality of all arguments to a function can contain 
members definable only in terms of the totality of its arguments.
Strong Impredicativity. No function can belong to a totality which is involved in 
its definition.
Weak Impredicativity. No function can have arguments definable only in terms 
of the function.
My immediate concern is with the first group of vicious circle principles; I will take up 
the “impredicativity principles” later. 
Weak VCP follows immediately from Function Dependence, but it is also a simple con-
sequence of just Argument Independence: If our concept of a propositional function is 
such that its arguments do not depend on the function itself, then functions cannot be 
involved in or presupposed by their arguments without contravening Argument Inde-
pendence. by contrast with Weak VCP, Strong VCP requires the full strength of Func-
tion Dependence. turning to General VCP, we can show that it holds for those totalities 
that are classes, and a fortiori, for those totalities of arguments to a function that are 
classes. Indeed, for such totalities, General VCP is a consequence of the semantic depen-
dency thesis and Argument Independence. For, by the semantic dependency thesis any 
truth concerning classes is transformable into one in which reference to the class is re-
placed by reference to a propositional function that determines it. In particular, if there 
were a truth concerning a class that contained a member involving or presupposing the 
class, there would be a corresponding truth concerning a propositional function one 
of whose arguments involved or presupposed the function. but this is impossible by 
Argument Independence.
turning to the impredicativity principles, in his (1944) gödel argued that from a realist 
perspective on the totalities comprised by sets, the imposition of General Impredicativ-
ity is not justified. From such a perspective, a definition is merely an expression that 
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uniquely specifies the defined entity. There is therefore nothing problematic in the no-
tion that our only means of identifying a set might involve a quantification over a total-
ity to which it itself belongs. gödel argued that for an impredicative definition to be 
problematic, one must think of the definition as not merely a specification of the entity 
defined, but as somehow essential to the entity’s existence. This would be plausible if, 
for example, a definition were thought of as an explanation of how to effect a construc-
tion of what is defined. For it could then be argued that an entity cannot be assumed 
in its own construction. but if we conceive of sets as existing independently of our 
constructions, there is no reason to accept General Impredicativity. 
In response to this argument of gödel’s, goldfarb (1989) observed that the defense of 
impredicative definitions of sets depends on an assumption much less tendentious than 
realism. A set is an extensional entity whose members are essential to it, but no defining 
formula is essential to its identity. sets are not preserved under change of elements, but 
it is a matter of indifference to the identity of a set whether or not it is specified by a 
defining formula that contains a quantified variable whose range includes the set itself. 
The prohibition against impredicative definitions of sets therefore lacks any intuitive 
basis even if one is not a realist regarding their existence. 
goldfarb’s observation is certainly correct. The point might be put by saying that the 
acceptability of General Impredicativity turns on a commitment regarding the essence 
of sets, rather than one regarding their existence. The nature of the basis for the exten-
sionality that sets enjoy suffices to show why one might plausibly reject General Im-
predicativity for them. but gödel’s chief contention was that only a form of anti-realism 
could sustain the imposition of General Impredicativity on propositional functions. As 
goldfarb recognizes (p. 31), his observation does not by itself refute this contention of 
gödel’s, but shows only that since propositional functions are not extensional entities, 
they may be constrained by General Impredicativity, not that they must be. goldfarb’s 
proposal for addressing this lacuna is to argue that our access to a propositional func-
tion is altogether different from the access we have to a class specified by the function:
to specify a class is to give a propositional function that is true of all and only 
the members of the class. The specification must be understood on its own; given 
such an understanding, it is a further question whether or not a given class is the 
one specified. … [but] the comprehension axioms for propositional functions 
that are implicit in [Principia] involve not so much the specification of these 
entities as the presentation of them. I shall therefore use ‘presentation’ rather 
than ‘specification’ in this connection. (goldfarb 1989 pp. 31-32) 
goldfarb’s idea is that with the specification of a class there is a certain “space” between 
the specification and the class specified. but to “specify” a propositional function is to 
be “immediately presented with” the entity meant. The suggestion is an interesting one, 
but it is difficult to see how to make entirely explicit the notion of immediate presenta-
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tion on which it depends. It may therefore be worthwhile to see if there is an alternative 
approach which does not appeal to this notion. 
The strategy we followed for General, Strong and Weak VCP was to argue that they are 
forced by the concept of a propositional function. This strategy appears to be correct 
for the impredicativity principles controlling functions since a definition which violates 
Strong or Weak Impredicativity can be excluded on the ground that the function it pur-
ports to express would violate Strong and Weak VCP. but General Impredicativity has 
a different justification, one that depends on the centrality of propositional functions 
to the explanation of our knowledge of classes—in effect, on the fact that classes are 
known as the extensions of propositional functions. According to the logical theory, an 
expression that defines a class in terms of a totality to which the defining function itself 
belongs fails to define it by a propositional function. A logical theory which permitted 
such a definition would therefore be incapable of supporting Principia’s explanation of 
how classes are known. 
consider, again, the celebrated Frege-Dedekind definition of the natural numbers as 
the class determined by the function that holds of those individuals which satisfy all 
inductive functions of zero. This definition fails to express a propositional function 
because it allows a function to fall within the range of one of its quantified variables. 
consequently, what the definition expresses violates both Weak and Strong VCP. The 
rationale for General Impredicativity is therefore that the definitions it excludes fail to 
express propositional functions, and hence cannot support the epistemic dependency 
thesis. but the justification for imposing General Impredicativity can only be achieved by 
demonstrating the adequacy of the hierarchy of classes that are capable of being known 
by propositional functions which accord with Strong and Weak VCP. This brings us to 
the axiom of reducibility.
8. The axiom of reducibility
On the present reconstruction, axioms of reducibility are introduced to ensure the epis-
temic accessibility of enough classes. The axioms are formulated with typical ambiguity 
and so occur at every type.10 such axioms postulate that the quantified variables of a 
propositional function range over predicative extensional equivalents of functions of 
every order within a type. A function is prohibited from falling within the range of one 
of its quantified variables, but ramification imposes no such prohibition on functions 
coextensive with it. On the reconstruction I am proposing, the point of the 1910 theory 
is epistemic rather than reductive: the theory is concerned to explain our knowledge of 
classes, not to explain classes away; and the role of axioms of reducibility is to secure 
10 The simplest example of an axiom of reducibility involves the postulation of predicative equivalents of propo-
sitional functions of a single argument; formally, ∃χ∀u(ϕu ≡ χ!u), where the exclamation mark indicates that χû 
is a predicative function.
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our knowledge of certain classes in terms of non-predicative functions by the postula-
tion of predicative functions. 
This essentially epistemological purpose of reducibility has been missed, even by some 
of Principia’s most astute commentators. Thus it has been noted of gödel that his 
remarks about the axiom of reducibility show [a] lack of sensitivity to the 
essentially intensional character of russell’s logic; the fact that every propositional 
function is coextensive with one of lowest order does not imply ‘the existence in 
the data of the kind of objects to be constructed’ (1944 p. 141), if the objects 
in question are … propositional functions rather than classes. … The ramified 
hierarchy with reducibility would fit with a conception according to which classes 
are admitted as ‘real objects,’ but the conception of propositional function is … 
constructivistic. (Parsons 1990 pp. 112-113)11 
While the postulation of predicative equivalents of functions of all orders significantly 
affects the totality of classes that are determined by non-predicative functions, the in-
clusion of predicative equivalents in the range of such a function’s variables leaves intact 
the account of our knowledge of the propositional function itself. The fact that the 
functions postulated are merely coextensive with functions of higher order is evidently 
essential to the success of this strategy.
The theory of functions and classes with reducibility depends crucially on an under-
standing of generality according to which the use of a variable does not require knowl-
edge of its values. There is no presumption that it should be possible, even in principle, 
to know any function or individual in the range of a variable to a function: 
a function can be apprehended without its being necessary to apprehend its 
values severally or individually. If this were not the case, no function could be 
apprehended at all, since the number of values (true and false) of a function is 
necessarily infinite and there are necessarily possible arguments with which we 
are unacquainted. (Principia pp. 39-40) 
In Problems of philosophy, russell devotes a great deal of space to the defense of this 
account of general knowledge, seeking to establish that much of what appears to re-
quire knowledge of particular instances does not in fact do so. The problem becomes 
especially pressing in connection with a priori knowledge, since it is supposed to be 
independent of knowledge of particular facts of experience, and thus, of the existence 
of particular individuals. russell argues that we can understand a proposition purport-
ing to express a priori knowledge without knowing the constituents of any instance of 
11 The reconstruction of ramification plus reducibility proposed here is one possible development of Parsons’s sug-
gestion, but I do not know if it conforms to what he had in mind or whether he would even agree with it.
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the proposition, and that we can do so compatibly with an empiricist commitment to 
the primacy of acquaintance and to the contention that all knowledge of particular ex-
istence is a posteriori. There are even cases of a posteriori known general truths that do 
not depend on knowledge of their instances. russell’s example is the proposition
(§) There are numbers greater than 1000 which no one has ever thought of.
by the nature of the case we cannot know an instance of (§), since that would require 
knowing the number which is a constituent of the instance, thereby precluding the 
instance from being a witness to the truth of (§). 
This suggests the following view of the significance of russell’s theory of descriptions 
for his subsequent logical discoveries. The interest of that theory is usually restricted to 
its application to the semantic issues posed by vacuous descriptions. From such a per-
spective, analyzing classes away after the fashion of the contextual analysis of vacuous 
singular terms is naturally viewed as the principal lesson the theory of descriptions has 
to offer for Principia’s account of classes. but by focusing on the elimination of the bear-
ers of vacuous descriptions, it is easy to lose sight of the theory of description’s equally 
important epistemic applications; these arise in cases where there is no question of 
failure of reference. Principia’s theory of knowledge of classes parallels russell’s gen-
eral theory of knowledge of things; its theory would also collapse if our understanding 
of generality demanded knowledge of instances. classes stand to the functions which 
determine them as things stand to the descriptive functions they satisfy. Just as there 
are many descriptions of the same thing, so also, the same class is capable of being the 
extension of many functions. Knowledge of a class by means of a predicative function 
corresponds, in the theory of knowledge of things, to being acquainted with the thing 
known and in possession of a logically proper name for it. Knowledge of a class by 
means of a non-predicative function is the analog of knowledge of a thing by means 
of a logically complex description. The nature of a non-predicative function follows its 
canonical linguistic expression in the language of Principia; knowledge of the function 
proceeds from knowledge of its predicative components and the logical form of their 
combination. In the case of knowledge of things, the transparency of the components 
of the description by which a thing is specified is epistemic: the components of the de-
scription (or rather, the components of the propositional function which replaces it) are 
known by acquaintance. but although the components are known by acquaintance, the 
description to which they belong may be satisfied by something that transcends our ac-
quaintance. by the epistemic dependency thesis, our access to classes is through propo-
sitional functions. A class for which we lack a predicative function is accessible only if it 
is determined by a logical construction built from known predicative functions. In the 
case of classes, the relevant transparency of the components of the functions by which 
they are known is their logical transparency, the fact that the basic functional constitu-
ents are predicative functions. In analogy with the theory of knowledge of things which 
transcend our acquaintance, although the basic component propositional functions are 
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predicative, the class determined by the logical construction which they comprise can 
be one that is not known by means of a predicative function. 
It is difficult to motivate the theory consisting of ramified types plus reducibility when 
it is separated from its epistemological point. Nor is it easy to see in what sense the 
reducibility axioms represent an advance over the mere postulation of classes. but they 
represent such an advance in at least two respects: They preserve the logical theory of 
our knowledge of classes, according to which classes are known as the extensions of 
propositional functions; and the reducibility axioms also preserve an attractive repre-
sentation of our knowledge of particular classes in terms of non-predicative functions. 
In connection with this second advance, the primary example of such an attractive 
representation is the impredicative definition of the class of natural numbers of Frege 
and Dedekind. It is not required that we know the values of a variable occupying the 
argument-place of a function in order to know the class the function determines. but 
it is required that the range of its values be sufficiently extensive in order that the func-
tion should determine the intended class. The ramified analog of the Frege-Dedekind 
definition captures the class of natural numbers only through the intervention of the 
axiom of reducibility. It is for this reason that the correctness of Principia’s reformula-
tion of the definition has been sometimes thought to capture the class of natural num-
bers only “accidentally,” by the coincidence that the range of the variable which occurs 
in it is as a matter of fact sufficiently extensive. such contingency at the foundational 
level is characteristic of the analysis of Principia, and is perhaps most conspicuous in 
its formulation of its axiom of infinity. As we have just seen, it also arises in connec-
tion with reducibility. but contingency is not ad hocness, and whatever its defects, this 
consequence of the analysis has the virtue of making explicit the postulates that honest 
logical toil would appear to require.
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